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I. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this article is to provide a complete, analytical survey
of warranty law in Florida. In addition, because of its close association
and frequent confusion with warranty, the concept of strict liability in
tort will be reviewed and presented as an alternative to implied warranty
in certain factual situations.
As a preface, a definition of terms should prove helpful. Express
warranty is an affirmation of fact, promise, description or model trans-
mitted from the seller to the buyer and made "part of the basis of the
bargain."' Implied warranty is divided into two categories-merchant-
ability and fitness for a particular purpose. In the former, the law implies
a warranty by a seller who deals in goods of that kind to the buyer that
such goods are "fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are
used."2 The latter division, fitness for a particular purpose, is applicable
when the seller "knows the particular purpose for which the goods are
required" and the buyer relies on the "seller's skill or judgment."3
* LL.B., University of Miami; Member, Florida Bar; Fellow, International Academy
of Trial Lawyers; Fellow and Director, Academy of Florida Trial Lawyers; Member, Ameri-
can Trial Lawyers Association; Member, American Bar Association; Author, Trial Hand-
book for Florida Lawyers; Partner in law firm of Colson & Hicks.
** Editor-in-Chief, University of Miami Law Review; Student Instructor in Freshmen
Legal Research and Writing.
1. FLA. STAT. § 672.313(1)(1969). The UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, consisting of
Florida Statutes chapters 671-680 inclusive, was adopted in Florida effective January 1,
1967. [Hereinafter cited as UCC.] The effective date of the UCC is particularly significant in
classifying cases cited as pre-Code or post-Code.
2. FLA. STAT. § 672.314(1), (2)(1969).
3. FLA. STAT. § 672.315 (1969). The warranty of fitness for a particular purpose might
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Strict liability in tort, which basically renders the supplier of a defective
product strictly liable for personal injuries caused by the product, is sub-
ject to varying characterizations dependent upon the jurisdiction in which
it was embraced.4 However, one thread of consistency runs throughout
the strict liability concept-the complete separation of tort and contract.
The contractual relationship is forever divorced from the strict tort
liability recovery.
II. ExPREss WARRANTY
The express warranty, in sharp contrast to its implied counterpart,
has been a minor object of judicial attention in Florida. In an early
warranty case, the supreme court held that there could not be an express
warranty of the quantity of the goods sold in the absence of reliance by
the buyer on the verbal warranty of the seller.5 The factor of reliance by
the buyer on the express warranty provided by the seller received extensive
treatment from the first district court of appeal which has held that:
To constitute an express warranty, the term 'warrant' need not
be used; no technical set of words is required, and a warranty
may be inferred from the affirmation of a fact which induces the
purchase and on which the buyer relies and on which the seller
intended that he should so do.'
However, the statutory UCC definition of an express warranty 7 does not
require reliance by the buyer, thus modifying the case law. The UCC only
demands that the warranty become part of the basis of the bargain.
III. IMPLIED WARRANTY
A. Food
Implied warranty as a ground for relief to the injured consumer
achieved its primary recognition in cases involving foodstuffs. In Blanton
v. Cudahy Packing Company,8 the supreme court permitted an injured
purchaser of unwholesome canned meat to recover against the manu-
facturer based upon an implied warranty of merchantability (whole-
someness and fitness for human consumption). The fact that the
plaintiff-consumer was not in actual privity of contract with the defendant-
manufacturer was found to be inconsequential.
be more appropriately designated as a hybrid between an express and implied warranty
rather than as a pure form of the latter. Similar to the express warranty, the seller knows
the very purpose for which the product is to be used; the seller expressly, though in action
(the act of selling) and not in words, warrants the suitability of the goods for such use;
and the buyer relies upon the seller's superior skill and judgment in purchasing the product.
4. See pp. 262-64 infra for a discussion of the leading cases on strict liability in tort.
5. George v. Drawdy, 56 Fla. 303, 47 So. 939 (1909).
6. Escambia Chemical Corp. v. Industrial-Marine Supply Co., 223 So.2d 773, 775
(Fla. 1st Dist. 1969).
7. FLA. STAT. § 672.313 (1969).
8. 154 Fla. 872, 19 So.2d 313 (1944).
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The rationale of the implied warranty theory of liability is in
effect that the right of recovery by injured consumers ought not
to depend upon or turn on the intricacies of the law of sale nor
upon the privity of contract, but should rest on right, justice
and welfare of the general purchasing and consuming public.
The court spoke in terms of strict liability probably because of the prod-
uct involved, i.e., food. In any event, there was a relaxation of the require-
ment that privity exist in order to maintain an action in warranty.
In Cliett v. Lauderdale Biltmore Corporation,0 the supreme court
held a restaurant liable for serving impure food, relying on the theory of
implied warranty of fitness or wholesomeness, in spite of the possibility
that such "transaction [may] be termed a service. . . 2 The court
avoided the contractual distinction of sale versus service by relegating
any discussion of it to the background. A year later, the same tribunal
found the retailer of impure food sold in sealed packages to be subject to
an implied warranty action brought by the injured consumer. 2
The next major event in the development of the law of implied
warranty of food involved a determination of what constituted an
unwholesome product. The presence of worms in spinach was sufficient
to render such food unwholesome and unfit for human consumption, and
an action based on an implied warranty would lie.' In reaching its decision,
the court provided the following guideline:
[F] or the masses who have moved ahead of the Indians but who
perhaps have not reached the "snail set" such invertebrates as
worms and snails are generally frowned upon as totally unwhole-
some.'
4
Although worms may bear a distorted resembance to spinach, they were
not a natural ingredient of such food and thus liability for their presence
attached. The "foreign-natural" test was recently rejected by the fourth
district court of appeal. 5 The plaintiff was injured by a walnut shell
located in walnut ice cream sold by the defendant restaurant; he sued for
breach of implied warranty. The trial court employed the "foreign-natural"
test and found such shell to be a natural substance of the food served. In
reversing the lower court, the fourth district stated that the proper test
should be what is "reasonably expected" by the consumer in the
9. Id. at 876, 19 So.2d at 316.
10. 39 So.2d 476 (Fla. 1949).
11. Id. at 478. Under the UCC [FLA. STAT. § 672.314(1)(1969)], the "serving for value
of food and drink to be consumed either on the premises or elsewhere is a sale," thus dis-
counting the sale-service dichotomy.
12. Sencer v. Carl's Market, Inc., 45 So.2d 671 (Fla. 1950). The plaintiff became ill
upon consuming a can of unwholesome sardines.
13. Food Fair Stores of Florida v. Macurda, 93 So.2d 860 (Fla. 1957).
14. Id. at 861.
15. Zabner v. Howard Johnson's, Inc., 201 So.2d 824 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1967).
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food as served, not what might be natural to the ingredients of
that food prior to preparation.16
This new test of wholesomeness "is keyed to what is 'reasonably fit,""' 7
i.e., what a reasonable man would normally expect a food product to
contain.
Although the immediate seller of impure food is liable to the injured
consumer, a different result accrues where the food is provided gratui-
tously, as evidenced by a decision of the second district.18 A church
member, who was also a professional caterer, donated food for a fund-
raising dinner. The plaintiff ate the food prepared by the defendant and
suffered food poisoning. In a spirit other than that of brotherly love, the
plaintiff brought an action for breach of implied warranty of fitness
against the defendant donor of the deleterious food. The court held that
"before the doctrine of implied warranty of fitness is applicable, there
must be something more than mere voluntary activity on the part of the
defendant."' Although Cliett, supra, implied that a service may be the
basis of an implied warranty action, this case required that the service
performed be initially based upon a contractual relationship between the
relevant parties.
A case of special note involved a suit brought by the owner of a horse
against the manufacturer of horse feed for the death of the animal as a
result of poisonous substances in the food.20 Faced with the dilemma of
finding the horse feed to be "unfit for human consumption," the court
broadened the implied warranty of fitness to include animal food, in
light of Florida Statutes chapter 580, the Florida Commercial Feed Law.
In summary, the consumer of impure food can employ the implied
warranty action against a) the manufacturer, regardless of the lack of
privity of contract, b) the retailer, and c) the restaurant owner, but the
action does not lie against the gratuitous supplier of deleterious food.
B. Products Intended for Human Consumption
This category entails all products, other than foodstuffs, that may
either: 1) be taken into the body; 2) be applied to the skin; or 3) be used
as containers for products intended for consumption.
In the situation where the plaintiff purchased deleterious lipstick
from the defendant's store on the advice of a saleslady, the Supreme Court
of Florida ruled that an implied warranty of fitness for a particular pur-
pose arose where the buyer both expressed to the seller the particular
purpose for which the product was to be purchased and relied on the
seller's skill and judgment in purchasing the product.2 In other words,
16. Id.' at 826.
17. Id. at 827.
18. Wentzel v. Berliner, 204 So.2d 905 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1967).
19. Id. at 906.
20. Valdosta Milling Co. v. Garretson, 217 F.2d 625 (5th Cir. 1954).
21. Smith v. Burdine's, Inc., 144 Fla. 00, 198 So. 223 (1940).
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two requirements must be satisfied: 1) the seller must possess superior
knowledge of his goods; and 2) the buyer must inform the seller, either
expressly or impliedly, that he is relying upon the seller's skill and judg-
ment.
The issue of the liability of the cigarette manufacturer to one injured
from the smoking habit was raised by a Florida plaintiff in federal court."2
The case, which was exemplified by prolonged litigation, costly appeals,
and judicial uncertainty, encompassed an action for breach of implied
warranty brought by the widow of the estate of the husband who died of
lung cancer, allegedly caused from smoking the cigarettes manufactured
by the defendant. The Federal District Court for the Southern District of
Florida granted judgment for the defendant. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals withheld ruling until the Florida Supreme Court
answered the following question certified to them: whether the cigarette
manufacturer or distributor could be absolutely liable for breach of
implied warranty where the dangers to humans from smoking could not be
determined through the reasonable application of human skill and fore-
sight by the manufacturer or distributor.28 The supreme court answered
affirmatively: "a manufacturer's or seller's actual knowledge or oppor-
tunity for knowledge of a defective or unwholesome condition is wholly
irrelevant to his liability on the theory of implied warranty. 24 Upon
return to the federal appellate court, the case was held to contain sufficient
evidence to go to the trial jury for a determination of whether the
defendant's cigarettes were reasonably fit and wholesome for human
consumption.25 The defendant once again prevailed in the second trial
in the southern district court. However, the Fifth Circuit reversed and
remanded the case, and further directed the lower court to enter judgment
for the plaintiff on the question of liability, even though the plaintiff
did not conclusively establish an actual defect or adulteration in the
product.26 A year later, on a rehearing en banc, the court adopted the
dissent of Justice Simpson in their previous decision,2 and affirmed the
lower court judgment for the defendant manufacturer.2" In terms of the
law of implied warranty, the final outcome of the litigation placed the
burden on the plaintiff of proving that there was an actual defect or
adulteration in the product; the mere existence of injury as a result of
using the product did not sufficiently meet that burden. The scope of
implied warranty is reasonable wholesomeness and fitness for use by the
22. The history of the case, Green v. American Tobacco Co., and citations will be
provided in the text and subsequent footnotes.
23. 304 F.2d 70 (5th Cir. 1962).
24. 154 So.2d 169, 170 (Fla. 1963). Such knowledge, however, does become important
in determining the seller's superior position in an action for implied warranty of fitness for
a particular purpose.
25. 325 F.2d 673 (5th Cir. 1963).
26. 391 F.2d 97 (5th Cir. 1968).
27. Id. at 111 (Simpson, J., dissenting).
28. 409 F.2d 1166 (1969).
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public, and the action is not limited by the manufacturer's or seller's in-
ability to detect the defect.
In the warranting of blood provided for human injection, the courts
have distinguished between the private blood bank and the hospital,
holding only the former liable in implied warranty for the transfusion of
impure blood.29 The transfer of blood by a hospital to a patient was a
service, not a sale; thus, there could not be a breach of an implied
warranty. 0 However, dissatisfied with the warranty liability of the
community blood bank, the state legislature amended the relevant UCC
provision" so as to grant the commercial blood supplier the same im-
munity provided by judicial legislation to the hospital transfusion. The
sale of blood by a profit-making institution was thus transformed into a
service, and the implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for a
particular purpose could not attach to such a transaction.
Another transaction in the medical field where warranties of fitness
or merchantability may be implied is the sale of prescription drugs on
the retail level. However, where the drug supplied was unadulterated, the
plaintiff could not hold the defendant, a retail druggist, liable on a breach
of implied warranty theory for harmful effects produced by the drug sold.82
The supreme court refused to place responsibility for the injuries suffered
by the plaintiff upon the druggist, who was judged to be without fault. In
the sale of a prescription drug, the retail druggist only warrants that:
1. he will compound the drug prescribed;
2. he has used due and proper care in filling the prescription
(failure of which might also give rise to an action in negli-
gence);
3. the proper methods were used in the compounding process;
4. the drug has not been infected with some adulterating foreign
substance.88
The adulterated soft drink or candy bar has resulted in many implied
warranty actions by injured consumers. The consumer may maintain an
action in implied warranty against the bottler for harm sustained due to
the presence of foreign material in the beverage.8 4 In a case involving an
adulterated soft drink, the supreme court clarified the plaintiff's burden
of proof in such a situation: "the consumer is [not] required to present
positive evidence negativing tampering or a reasonable opportunity for
tampering with the contents of the bottle, after it left the bottler's control,
29. Community Blood Bank, Inc., v. Russell, 196 So.2d 115 (Fla. 1967), aff'g 185
So.2d 749 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1966).
30. Hoder v. Sayet, 196 So.2d 205 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967). The second district adopted
the Hoder rationale in White v. Sarasota County Public Hospital Board, 206 So.2d 19 (Fla.
2d Dist. 1968).
31. FLA. STAT. § 672.316(5) (1969).
32. McLeod v. W. S. Merrell Co., 174 So.2d 736 (Fla. 1965).
33. Id. at 739. The court also discussed strict liability in tort under RESTATEmENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1964), but found the theory inapplicable to retail druggists.
34. Florida Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Jordan, 62 So.2d 910 (Fla. 1953).
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in order to recover." 5 Analogizing the sealed candy bar containing pins
to the bottled soft drink adulterated with foreign substances, the second
district stated that "the rationale of the implied warranty of fitness rule
applies with equal force in all these situations,"8 6 thus permitting the
injured plaintiff to receive damages from both the manufacturer and
retailer of the deleterious, pin-studded candy bar.
The rationale of the "bottled or sealed foreign matter" cases has been
extended to the containers of such beverages. 7 The purchaser of a soft
drink brought an action based upon an implied warranty of merchant-
ability against the bottler and retailer for injuries received when the
bottle broke while being opened. In sanctioning the expansion of the
doctrine of implied warranty to include glass containers, the court
reasoned that the "bottle and its contents are so closely related that it is
difficult-if not impossible-to draw a distinction."88 Although the plain-
tiff did recover from both the manufacturer and retailer, the vulnerability
of the retailer to implied warranty liability was shortlived. The Supreme
Court of Florida in Foley v. Weaver Drugs, Inc. 9 absolved the retail seller
of a product sold in a container from any liability under an implied
warranty theory for injuries caused by the container. However, under the
UCC, the seller of packaged goods impliedly warrants that the product
sold is "adequately contained [and] packaged; 4 therefore, the retailer's
liability appears to have been reinstated. By the inclusion of the manu-
facturer of a soft drink six-pack carton within the category of seller, the
manufacturer would appear to be liable for breach of implied warranty of
merchantability when the carton gave way, allowing the bottles to fall
and injure the plaintiff's foot. Although the UCC would impose such
liability, a case involving a pre-Code transaction did not do so.41 To
recover in such a situation, the first district required the plaintiff to
prove that the defendant named actually manufactured the defective
carton; a mere assembler of the carton would not be liable. This decision
seems contrary to the general trend of recent, forward-looking rulings of
the Florida courts and courts throughout the country, which hold the
assembler of a product responsible not only for the items in the final
35. Miami Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Todd, 101 So.2d 34, 36 (Fla. 1958). For additional
clarification, the court distinguished the "bottled foreign matter" case from the "exploding
bottle" case by commenting that "in the latter situation common experience indicates that
rough or unusual handling frequently contributed to the bursting," while in the former
situation the entrance of foreign material into the bottle after it is capped is a rare
occurrence.
36. Wagner v. Mars, Inc., 166 So.2d 673, 674 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964).
37. Canada Dry Bottling Co. v. Shaw, 118 So.2d 840 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1960).
38. Id. at 842. In fact, the plaintiff is entitled to the presumption that a bottle that is
not defective will not burst. See Renninger v. Foremost Dairies, Inc., 171 So.2d 602 (Fla.
3d Dist. 1965).
39. 177 So.2d 221 (Fla. 1965). Essentially, this case overruled Canada Dry Bottling
Co. v. Shaw in regard to the retailer's liability for a defective container, although the
court only stated that it disapproved of that part of the Shaw case.
40. FLA. STAT. § 672.314(2) (e) (1969).
41. Gay v. Kelly, 200 So.2d 568 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1967).
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package it actually manufactures, but also for those items manufactured
by others.42 Query, should a bottler be allowed to escape responsibility for
a defective six-pack carton produced by a manufacturer of its sole
choosing, who, by the time of suit, may be out of business, financially
irresponsible, or not amenable to service of process in the jurisdiction
where the injury occurred?
The state of the law in this area can be summed up by the following.
The purchaser of a defective product intended for human consumption,
for bodily application, or for use as a container of a consummable good
can recover under warranty from the retailer and the manufacturer. The
only exception is that the retailer of a defective container and the assem-
bler, but not the actual manufacturer, of a faulty carton are not liable
under the pre-Code case law, whereas they are subject to warranty liability
under the UCC.
C. Other Products
Whereas the warranty law governing the sale or manufacture of
deleterious foodstuffs and consumables has become fairly settled, the
same cannot be said for those products outside the realm of human
consumption and any legal conclusion as to the future course of the law
is tenuous at best.
Judicial recognition of implied warranty in Florida began with the
case of Berger v. Berger & Company." The plaintiff-purchaser sued
the defendant-seller of lumber which did not meet specifications requested
by the buyer and promised by the seller. The court found the seller liable,
stating that:
[w] here a person contracts to supply an article in which he deals
for a particular purpose, knowing the purpose for which he
supplies and that the purchaser has no opportunity to inspect
the article, but relies upon the judgment of the seller, there is an
implied condition or 'warranty,' . . that the article is fit for the
purpose to which it is to be applied.4
Despite the emergence of implied warranty, caveat emptor remained the
general rule. The Fifth Circuit, applying Florida law, held that the seller
42. See King v. Douglas Aircraft Co., 159 So.2d 108 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964). This case was
cited as controlling authority in Holman v. Ford Motor Co., 239 So.2d 40 (Fla. 1st Dist.
1970), wherein the court held that the automobile manufacturer could not avoid liability
under an implied warranty theory by arguing that the defective power brake booster unit
(the defect caused the plaintiff's automobile to have brake failure) was manufactured by
a supplier corporation other than itself.
It would seem unconscionable to us if Ford were permitted to shrink its duty to
stand behind the products that it sells to the public through its dealer organization
on the very shallow excuse that the defective component was manufactured by
a supplier selected by it rather than by Ford itself.
Id. at 42. The same reasoning should apply to the soft drink manufacturer-assembler in
the Gay decision.
43. 76 Fla. 503, 80 So. 296 (1918).
44. Id. at 513, 80 So. at 299.
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of a product manufactured by another and available for inspection by
the buyer was not subject to an implied warranty of the quality of the
particular product sold.45 The Supreme Court of Florida, relying upon
caveat emptor, denied recovery under implied warranty to the purchaser
of a defective stepladder even though the seller's agent orally verified the
product's strength and longevity.4" The nature of the product was the key
to the decision. The buyer could "know as much as a salesman [about] a
stepladder by simply looking at it."47 Providing the buyer with an equal
opportunity to inspect the stepladder nullified superior knowledge on the
part of the seller. However, some products, such as seed, were incapable
of reasonable inspection to ascertain their true character, and the buyer
was forced to rely solely on the seller supplying the proper article. In
such a situation, the products sold by the retailer were accompanied by an
implied warranty that they were true to their name, irrespective of any
inspection made by the buyer. 8 The liability for breach of an implied
warranty of particular variety was later extended to the wholesaler who
mislabeled the variety of the seed sold. 9
Related to the situation of seller mislabeling is the problem of the
seller's misguidance.50 During the course of the sale of dynamite, the
vendor, though not required to do so, furnished the buyer with special
instructions differing from those provided by the manufacturer on the use
and handling of the explosives. By volunteering such instructions, an
implied warranty arose "that the dynamite caps and fuses were fit for the
particular purpose on the condition that the user complied with the
specific instructions." 51
The progress of implied warranty took an uncertain turn in Matthews
v. Lawnlite.52 While trying out a lounge chair manufactured by the
defendant, the prospective customer had his finger amputated by a
moving mechanism located on the underside of the arm of the chair. The
supreme court, in the process of finding the manufacturer liable for the
injuries sustained, asserted the dual theories of negligence and breach of
implied warranty, neglecting to designate either one as the basis of
recovery. The court did adopt Restatement of Torts § 398, which imposed
liability upon a negligent manufacturer of a product made under a
dangerous plan or design. The manufacturer in this case did not exercise
45. Tampa Shipbuilding & Engineering v. General Construction Co., 43 F.2d 309 (5th
Cir. 1930).
46. Lambert v. Sistrunk, 58 So.2d 434 (Fla. 1952).
47. Id. at 435. A different result would occur if there was no opportunity to inspect,
i.e., lipstick and canned foods, where the buyer relies exclusively on the seller's judgment.
48. West Coast Lumber Co. v. Wernicke, 137 Fla. 363, 188 So. 357 (1939). The case
dealt with seed that was incorrectly labelled and of a poorer quality than that sought by
the purchaser.
49. Hoskins v. Jackson Grain Co., 63 So.2d 514 (Fla. 1953). The court also alluded to
the negligence theory of false and misleading labelling.
50. Southern Pine Extracts Co. v. Bailey, 75 So.2d 774 (Fla. 1954).
51. Id. at 776.
52. 88 So.2d 299 (Fla. 1956).
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reasonable care in the adoption of a safe plan or design when it failed to
provide a protective housing for the dangerous mechanism hidden from
the plaintiff's view. Not content with only a negligence theory, the court
proceeded to intertwine the implied warranty concept. Although the
lounge chair was not considered a dangerous instrumentality," the
particular concealed moving parts that severed the plaintiff's finger were
declared "inherently dangerous." Based upon their dangerous character,
the court appeared to extend the implied warranty of merchantability,
absent privity of contract, to the prospective or potential purchaser, who
was equated with the actual customer.
The first definitive statement concerning the necessity of privity of
contract in an implied warranty action against the manufacturer of a
nonconsumable product appeared in an action to recover economic loss."
Privity of contract was not an essential prerequisite to recovery by the
ultimate consumer from the manufacturer for breach of implied warranty
in the sale of electrical cable. However, in Carter v. Hector Supply Com-
pany," the supreme court reaffirmed the need for privity in an implied
warranty action against the retailer. The plaintiff, an employee of the
purchaser of a riding sulky, brought an action for breach of implied
warranty of fitness against the retailer for injuries sustained when the
frame of the sulky collapsed due to a latent defect. The court dismissed
the action stating that "one who is not in privity with a retailer has no
action against him for breach of an implied warranty, except in situations
involving foodstuffs or perhaps dangerous instrumentalities."58 Since the
sulky was not a dangerous instrumentality, the plaintiff's only remedy
was a negligence action. This holding was immediately accepted by the
federal courts located in Florida. The northern district federal court
would not permit the employee of the purchaser of a defective tire to
seek relief under breach of implied warranty from the retailer or wholesaler
of the tire, since there was not privity of contract.57
Realizing that the strict construction of privity in Carter would lead
to overly harsh results in certain situations, the supreme court in McBurn-
ette v. Playground Equipment Corp. 8 brought into the circle of those in
privity with the retailer the member of the family for whom the article
was purchased. The sole issue was whether the retailer's implied warranty
53. "Dangerous instrumentalities have been defined as those which by nature are
reasonably certain to place life and limb in peril when negligently constructed, such as
airplanes, automobiles, guns and the like." Id. at 301, quoting from MacPherson v. Buick
Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 389, 111 N.E. 1050, 1053 (1916). For a thorough treatment of
the dangerous instrumentality exception, see Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Anderson, 80 Fla.
441, 86 So. 629 (1920).
54. Continental Copper & Steel Ind., Inc. v. E.C. "Red" Cornelius, Inc., 104 So.2d 40
(Fla. 3d Dist. 1958).
55. 128 So.2d 390 (Fla. 1961).
56. Id. at 393.
57. Odum v. Gulf Tire & Supply Co., 196 F. Supp. 35 (N.D. Fla. 1961).
58. 137 So.2d 563 (Fla. 1962).
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of fitness for use as playground equipment ran only to the father-
purchaser or to his injured minor son for whose use the slide set was
bought. The court reasoned that:
common sense requires the presumption that one in the position
of the minor plaintiff in this cause is a naturally intended and
reasonably contemplated beneficiary of the warranty of fitness
for use or merchantability implied by law, and as such he stands
in the shoes of the purchaser in enforcing the warranty. 9
Though the court had no difficulty in rationalizing that the implied
warranty of the retailer should apply to the intended user of the product,
it declined the opportunity in a subsequent case to extend such warranty
protection to the mere bystander. 60 The plaintiff-bystander was injured
when a rubber disc attachment to a sanding kit purchased by his brother
disintegrated and caused particles to fly into his eye.
Whatever inroads have been made in recent years toward
liberalizing the availability of the implied warranty action
against one not in privity with the injured, the courts of this
state have never relaxed the requirement that the injured be
a user of the product involved.61
Various attempts have been made to define the scope of implied
warranty in terms of consumers and "intended users." The third district62
sanctioned an action maintained by the representatives of victims of a
plane crash based upon an implied warranty of fitness of the airplane,
assembled by the defendant.6" The airplane manufacturer's implied
warranty ran in favor of the airline passengers, the intended users of the
product. In a subsequent case, one whose attorney had relied on false
information published in the defendant's desk book concerning the
statute of limitations for the client's original action could not avail
himself of implied warranty recovery against the publisher, since he was
not a user of the product. 4
The liability under warranty of one who manufactured a defective
product has been clearly established.65 While being served a hot drink in
a paper cup manufactured by the defendant, the body of the cup came
apart, scalding the plaintiff. The supreme court held that privity of
59. Id. at 566 (emphasis added).
60. Rodriguez v. Shell's City, Inc., 141 So.2d 590 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962).
61. Id. at 591.
62. King v. Douglas Aircraft Co., 159 So.2d 108 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
63. "An assembler of a product, who sells the completed product as its own and
thereby represents to the public that it is the manufacturer, is considered the manufacturer
of the component part." Id. at 110. See also Holman v. Ford Motor Co., 239 So.2d 40 (Fla.
1st Dist. 1970).
64. Engels v. Lawyer's Co-operative Publishing Co., 198 So.2d 93 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967).
65. Lily-Tulip Cup Corp. v. Bernstein, 181 So.2d 641 (Fla. 1966). The same result can
be reached under Florida Statutes § 672.314(2)(e) (1969). Cf. Gay v. Kelly, 200 So.2d
568 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1967).
1971]
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contract was not required to support an action by a consumer against a
manufacturer for breach of an implied warranty of a product that was
neither a dangerous instrumentality nor a foodstuff."0 Based upon this
apparent demise of privity, the third district allowed the remote ultimate
purchaser to recover property damage from the manufacturer of a defec-
tive component part (a pontoon that exploded upon being attached to the
finished watercraft) even though the plaintiff was not in direct privity
with the component manufacturer and the product was not within the
classification of food or dangerous instrumentality. 7
The "intended user" category of possible plaintiffs in an implied
warranty action was held to include employees of the purchaser, at least
in a suit brought against the manufacturer.68 The employees who were
injured as a result of a defective oil discharge hose manufactured by the
defendant were permitted to sue under an implied warranty, provided
they were using the hose in the manner intended at the time the accident
occurred. 9 The availability of the implied warranty remedy to injured
employees of the buyer was echoed by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
in Vandercock & Son, Inc. v. Thorpe."° Applying Florida law, the court
arrived at the conclusion that the employee-plaintiff could seek damages
from the manufacturer of a defectively designed printing press under a
breach of implied warranty,7 in the absence of privity of contract with
the manufacturer.
The breakthrough for the bystander injured by the operation of a
defective product occurred in the landmark case of Toombs v. Fort Pierce
Gas Co. 72 Actions for breach of implied warranty were brought by a
customer of the defendant gas company, the customer's family, and the
occupants of the adjacent apartment dwelling for injuries caused by the
explosion of a gas storage tank supplied and owned by the defendant.
The supreme court affirmed the lower court verdict, allowing recovery by
66. The lower court opinion avoided following Carter v. Hector Supply Co., 128 So.2d
390 (Fla. 1961), by limiting it to its facts; Carter involved the retailer, while the instant
case only concerned the manufacturer. Lily Tulip Cup Corp. v. Bernstein, 177 So.2d 362
(Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
67. Power Ski of Florida, Inc. v. Allied Chemical Corp., 188 So.2d 13 (Fla. 3d Dist.
1966).
68. Barfield v. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co., 197 So.2d 545 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1967).
69. In dictum, the second district stated that "where the requirement of privity of
contract was once necessary, it is now discarded in most instances where the cause of action
is breach of implied warranty." Id. at 546.
70. 395 F.2d 104 (5th Cir. 1968).
71. The Fifth Circuit outlined the quantum of proof necessary in an implied warranty
action:
(1) the plaintiff must show that a defect existed in the product before it left the
manufacturer; (2) that this defect caused the injury; (3) that he was a person
who was reasonably intended to use the product; and (4) that the product was
being used in the intended manner.
Id. at 105. See School Supply Service Company v. J.H. Keeney & Co., Inc., 410 F.2d 481
(5th Cir. 1969), a later decision by the Fifth Circuit, applying Florida law, regarding
liability of a seller for breach of implied warranty of sufficiency of product design.
72. 208 So.2d 615 (Fla. 1968). Noted, 23 U. MIAMI L. Rav. 266 (1968).
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all the plaintiffs, even the bystanders. Based upon the "humane or
reasonable" trend established by Matthews, McBurnette and Vandercock,
the court undermined the ruling in Carter :78 "the principles stated in the
Carter opinion [do not] support the novel premise that the warranty
remedy, irrespective of privity, is limited to users. '7 4 To further dispense
with the need for privity in this type of accident, the "dangerous instru-
mentality exception to the privity requirement," as expressed in earlier
cases,7 5 was acknowledged as expressly applicable, in view of the dangerous
character of the butane gas stored in the tanks.76
The inherently dangerous instrumentality qualification of the
privity requirement in warranty, when applicable, has ... been
regarded as extending liability to those persons one 'should
expect to use the chattel lawfully or to be in the vicinity of its
probable use.'77
Despite the progressive language in Toombs, the effect of the case upon
warranty law was subsequently scrutinized and qualified by the second
district court of appeal.7s The plaintiff, a policeman, was dispatched to
the Island Club to assist the guests suffering from exposure to chlorine
gas, which was escaping from pool containers (the gas and containers
were supplied by different defendants, but the gas was inserted into the
containers prior to delivery). Prior to offering help, the plaintiff was
provided a defective gas mask by the management of the Island Club (the
gas mask having been supplied previously to the club by the distributor
of the gas). As the plaintiff was removing the damaged gas tank, he
inhaled large amounts of gas, causing internal injuries. Relying primarily
on Toombs, the injured policeman sued the suppliers of both the gas and
containers for breach of implied warranty of fitness. In addition, the
Island Club and gas supplier were alleged to have breached their implied
warranty that the gas mask used by the plaintiff was suitable for use in
close proximity to chlorine gas. In disposing of the action against the
distributor of the gas containers, the court limited Toombs to owners or
manufacturers of inherently dangerous instrumentalities, and it did not
apply to transporters, as the defendant distributor was alleged to be. The
action against the owner and supplier of the gas containers was dismissed
73. In de-emphasizing the effect of Carter on the law of implied warranty, the court
also minimized the holding in Rodriguez since Carter was cited as controlling precedent in
the latter.
74. Toombs v. Fort Pierce Gas Company, 208 So.2d 615, 617 (Fla. 1968).
75. The primary case relied on by the court was Matthews v. Lawnlite Co., 88 So.2d
299 (Fla. 1956).
76. It is to be noted that the dangerous instrumentality was the butane gas, not the
container; thus, the law of sale applied, not that of bailment (the container was leased,
while the gas was sold by defendant distributor or owner).
77. Toombs v. Fort Pierce Gas Company, 208 So.2d 615, 617 (Fla. 1968). See FLA.
STAT. § 672.318 (1969), which extends warranty protection to members of the purchaser's
family or household, to household guests, and to employees of the buyer.
78. Adair v. The Island Club, 225 So.2d 541 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969).
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upon the basis that the "dangerous instrumentality qualification of the
privity requirement in warranty of the chlorine containers [could] not be
applied," since the plaintiff "did not act in reliance on the implied war-
ranty of the defendants.17 9 Once the plaintiff became aware of the dan-
gerous condition of the gas containers and proceeded to remove them in
the face of apparent hazard, he voided any contractual warranty. The
warranty action founded upon the defective gas masks was stricken
because of the absence of privity of contract between the plaintiff and the
suppliers of the gas mask. Since the gas mask was not an inherently
dangerous commodity, the privity exception of Toombs was inapplicable,
and the warranty rule in Carter requiring privity of contract, except in
certain cases, controlled. The police officer, therefore, was unable to
recover from any of the defendants.
When a nonproduct was involved, i.e., professional services, the
second district court would not permit the plaintiff-builder to sue the
defendant, an engineering firm, for faulty design and specifications under
a warranty theory; the plaintiff's only recourse was an action based on
negligence.80 The warranties of merchantability and fitness for an intended
use were held "uniquely applicable to goods" and did not apply to the
performance of professional services.8 '
In an attempt to highlight the prior law presented, the following
comments may be made. The consumer of a defective, nonconsumable
product has a valid claim against the manufacturer and retailer in implied
warranty for injuries sustained. The retailer's liability under pre-Code
law did not extend beyond the family or household of the purchaser, where-
as under the UCC (Florida Statutes § 672.318), the seller's implied
warranty "extends to any natural person who is in the family or house-
hold of his buyer, who is a guest in his home or who is an employee, ser-
vant or agent of his buyer." When the defective product is classifiable as
a dangerous instrumentality, the manufacturer can be held liable to those
expected to be in the vicinity of its probable use, i.e., bystanders, in addi-
tion to consumers and intended users. If the product be defective but not
a dangerous instrumentality, the manufacturer's liability is limited to
consumers and intended users, which includes employees of the buyer.
IV. DEFENSES AVAILABLE TO SELLER OR MANUFACTURER
A. Disclaimer
Based upon the premise that the written contract is supreme, the
Supreme Court of Florida has declared that "there will be no implication
of warranty in conflict with the express terms of the agreement."8 2 Con-
79. Id. at 546.
80. Audland Lumber & Builders Supply, Inc. v. D.E. Britt Assoc., Inc., 168 So.2d 333
(Fla. 2d Dist. 1964).
81. Id. at 335.
82. Steinhardt v. Consolidated Grocery Co., 80 Fla. 531, 535, 86 So. 431, 432 (1920).
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sequently, the law allowed the seller or manufacturer to "exclude any im-
plied warranty" with reference to a particular characteristic of the prod-
uct sold by providing an express warranty in the contract of sale relating
to the same matter.8 3
The first inroad on the use of the disclaimer as a defense to warranty
occurred in a case involving the sale of seed. 4 Even though the seller in-
corporated into the contract a clause disclaiming any warranties of de-
scription, quality, productiveness, etc., of the seed sold, the supreme court
acceded to the right of the buyer to bring an action for breach of implied
warranty where the seed purchased was of a different variety than that
bargained for. "A disclaimer or nonwarranty clause should [not] be con-
sidered a defense ... in cases where the suits are bottomed upon . . . vari-
ance in variety.""5 In a further effort to mitigate the effect of the dis-
claimer, the first district held that in the sale of a defective tractor "the
implied warranty of merchantability is not excluded by an express war-
ranty against defective parts and workmanship which is not inconsistent
with the implied warranty."8 6 Although in Rozen v. Chrysler Corp., 7 the
third district adopted this very concept of inconsistent warranties, the
court expressed it in language advantageous to the manufacturer of the
defective automobile:
Under Florida law, a written warranty of an automobile manu-
facturer containing a clause that is expressly in lieu of all other
warranties express or implied, limited the liability of the manu-
facturer to the terms of the warranty and excluded any other
warranty express or implied which was in conflict with the writ-
ten warranty."'
The Fifth Circuit subsequently circumvented the general rule stated in
Rozen, by finding the express warranty in the contract of sale of com-
puters to be consistent with an implied warranty of fitness for use. 9 The
court could not find any conflict between an express warranty "for the
making of adjustments and the replacement of broken and defective
parts" and an implied warranty of fitness.9 However, the same court,
one year later, held that an express warranty against faulty workmanship
83. Cohen v. Frima Products Co., 181 F.2d 324 (5th Cir. 1950).
84. Corneli Seed Co. v. Ferguson, 64 So.2d 162 (Fla. 1953).
85. Id. at 163-64. However, the disclaimer would be a valid defense where the failure
was in quality or productiveness.
86. Posey v. Pensacola Tractor & Equip. Co., 138 So.2d 777, 780 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1962).
87. 142 So.2d 735 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962).
88. Id. at 737.
89. Sperry Rand Corp. v. Industrial Supply Corp., 337 F.2d 363 (5th Cir. 1964).
90. Id. at 370. Furthermore, the court added that "a contract clause that all agree-
ments are contained in the writing does not operate to bar recovery on an implied warranty
of fitness for use." Id. at 371. In a concurring opinion by Justice Tillman Pearson in
Friedman v. Ford Motor Co., 179 So.2d 371, 372 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965) (a per curiam
opinion), the public policy argument against general disclaimers was presented: "the
public will requires that certain warranties of dangerous instrumentalities, such as auto-
mobiles, exist, even in the face of a general statement that no warranties are given."
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and defective materials that was in lieu of all other warranties, either
express or implied, was adequate to prohibit an implied warranty action
against the supplier."
The effectiveness of the automobile manufacturer's disclaimer of li-
ability was reduced by the Supreme Court of Florida in Manheim v.
Ford Motor Co."2 Discovering his newly purchased car to be a "lemon,"
the buyer promptly sued the dealer and manufacturer for breach of im-
plied warranty of fitness and suitability for use. The court, in reversing
a summary judgment entered in the trial court for the manufacturer on
the basis of his disclaimer, stated that "the execution of a written war-
ranty agreement between the manufacturer and dealer" which was in lieu
of any and all other warranties did not preclude recovery on the ground
of "implied warranty of a product due to its defects and lack of fitness
and suitability."9 Although Manheim only discussed the warranty liabil-
ity of the manufacturer, in Crown v. Cecil Holland Ford, Inc., 4 the third
district amplified the law established in Manheim so that the selling
dealer of the defective new car, as well as the manufacturer, was subject
to an implied warranty action, regardless of the existence of a warranty
provision expressly in lieu of any other express or implied warranties on
the part of the manufacturer or dealer. Nevertheless, the disclaimer of
the seller was not yet a dead letter. In apparent disregard of the implica-
tions of the Manheim and Crown decisions, the fourth district held that a
disclaimer clause in the contract of sale between the tractor dealer and
buyer which recited that the "above warranty is in lieu of all other war-
ranties, statutory or otherwise, express or implied" was competent to nul-
lify implied warranties of merchantability and fitness.95 The disclaimer
in a contract between a dealer and his purchaser was found to be clearly
distinguishable from the disclaimer in the contract between the manufac-
turer and its dealer; therefore, Manheim, which dealt only with the lat-
ter, was not controlling authority in the instant case, or so the court
reasoned."6
The effect of the UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, particularly Florida
Statutes section 672.316, on exclusionary clauses, was the central issue in
Ford Motor Company v. Pittman.7 A newly purchased Ford, on its own
initiative, internally and externally combusted, destroying itself by fire.
91. American Can Co. v. Horlamus Corp., 341 F.2d 730 (5th Cir. 1965).
92. 201 So.2d 440 (Fla. 1967).
93. Id. at 442.
94. 207 So.2d 67 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968). However, the third district later held that where
a vessel was sold "as is, where is," there could be no warranties as to the performance
capabilities of the vessel. Sokoloff v. Corinto Steamship Co., 225 So.2d 554 (Fla. 3d Dist.
1969). See FLA. STAT. § 672.316(3)(a) (1969).
95. DeSandolo v. F & C Tractor and Equip. Co., 211 So.2d 576 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1968).
Though the court was in conflict with its prior decisions, its recognition of the validity of
the disclaimer was consistent with the UCC provision, Florida Statutes § 672.316 (1969),
which stipulates the conditions when a disclaimer would be effective.
96. Id. at 579.
97. 227 So.2d 246 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1969).
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The bewildered plaintiff sued the manufacturer of the car for breach of
implied warranty of merchantability and fitness and for negligent fabri-
cation of the vehicle. In response to the manufacturer's disclaimer de-
fense, the first district set forth the burden of proof to be placed upon the
manufacturer who sought to avail himself of the defense. The manufac-
turer must show that it is a "seller" within the terms of the Code; "it
must prove a contract of the type required by §672.2-201;" and "it must
prove that the disclaimer clause was in fact a part of that contract." 98
Since the manufacturer was not the "seller" under the UCC, the dis-
claimer was invalid under prior case law. However, the major significance
of the case may be the subtle forecast of the end of the automobile dis-
claimer as being unconscionable under Florida Statutes sections 672.302
and 672.316(1) (1969). Is it not unconscionable to enforce a disclaimer
of implied warranty on an "expensive, complicated, dangerous instrumen-
tality capable of effecting human injury or death and designed to be pur-
chased and used by persons lacking knowledge in mechanics?" 9 In es-
sence, the issue becomes whether the manufacturer or seller can disclaim
a warranty, not of its own making, but implied by law to guarantee the
"right, justice, and welfare of the general purchasing and consuming
public. '100
B. Lessor or Bailor
The liability of the bailor for breach of warranty was first stated by
the supreme court in Williamson v. Phillipoff.1 1
The bailor, by the bailment, impliedly warrants that the thing
hired is of a character and in a condition to be used as contem-
plated by the contract, and he is liable for damages occasioned
by the faults or defects of the article hired.0
However, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals merged the implied war-
ranty remedy into a negligence action against the lessor or bailor in a
case involving personal injuries to the plaintiff when the automobile
leased from the defendant went out of control on the road.'0° In disposing
of the action, the court ruled that it was immaterial whether the lessor's
liability be grounded on implied warranty or negligence "because in any
98. Id. at 249. Realizing that the manufacturer of stock items may not qualify as a
seller to the ultimate consumer under the UCC and recognizing the Code's acceptance of
disclaimers on the part of sellers [Florida Statutes §§ 672.316,7 (1969)], Ford Motor
Company ingeniously, but unsuccessfully, attempted to convince the court that it was the
actual seller of the car and the dealer was only its agent. This argument was quickly dis-
carded by the court since the manufacturer could not qualify as a seller under Florida
Statutes § 672.103 (1969).
99. Ford Motor Co. v. Pittman, 227 So.2d 246, 250 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1969).
100. Blanton v. Cudahy Packing Co., 154 Fla. 872, 876, 19 So.2d 313, 316 (1944).
101. 66 Fla. 549, 64 So.2d 269 (1914).
102. Id. at 554, 64 So. at 271.
103. Clarkson v. Hertz Corp., 266 F.2d 948 (5th Cir. 1959). The case was on appeal
from Florida's Southern District Federal Court.
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event, in the absence of any contract cases establishing any higher stan-
dard of care, the duty on the party to be charged remains one of due
care,' ' 4 and the defendant met that duty. Subsequently, the third dis-
trict, citing this Fifth Circuit opinion as authority, unequivocally re-
stricted the injured bailee-lessee to the lone theory of negligence in a suit
against the owner-operator of malfunctioning washing machines.105
Under warranty theory, there is no absolute liability on a bailor
or lessor of personal property who rents or permits its use by
another. The liability of a manufacturer, under the doctrine of
implied warranty, has not been extended to one who merely
rents or bails personal property [which it has purchased from a
manufacturer] to another. The extent of the obligation of the
bailor is a duty on his part to exercise due care to furnish an ar-
ticle in a reasonably safe condition. 06
In direct conflict with the last two cases stands a recent supreme court
decision,0 7 which reaffirmed the position adopted a half-century before
in Williamson. Although the court realized that a warranty of fitness
would not arise in all lease transactions, the injured bailee for hire did
have a valid cause of action against the bailor for breach of implied war-
ranty of suitability of the chattel for the bailee's known and intended use
of it if the following condition was satisfied.
In the absence of an agreement to the contrary, where the lessor
has reason to know any particular purpose for which the leased
chattel is required and that the lessee is relying upon the lessor's
skill or judgment to select or furnish a suitable chattel, there is
an implied warranty that the chattel shall be fit for such pur-
pose.108
C. Agent for a Disclosed Principal
The purchaser of a defective automobile has a cause of action for
breach of implied warranty against the manufacturer, but not against the
dealer who is in fact the local authorized agent of the manufacturer: "An
agent contracting on behalf of a disclosed principal [Ford Motor Com-
pany] and within the scope of his authority as agent, cannot be held li-
able for breach of implied warranty." 0 9 This rule was reaffirmed in a
later decision by the same first district court where it was held that a pur-
chaser who dealt with a disclosed principal could not hold the dealer-
104. Id. at 950.
105. Brookshire v. Florida Bendix Co., 153 So.2d 5 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963), cert. denied,
163 So.2d 881 (Fla. 1964).
106. Id. at 58.
107. W. E. Johnson v. United Airlines, Inc., 238 So.2d 98 (Fla. 1970).
108. Id. at 100.
109. Smith v. Platt Motors, Inc., 137 So.2d 239, 242 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1962). The result
might have been different if the complaint had alleged additional work done by the dealer
in assembling and preparing the car for delivery to the plaintiff.
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agent liable for breach of implied warranty." 0 However, the more recent
cases have refused to accept the contention that an automobile dealer is
an agent for a disclosed principal, thus subjecting the dealer to warranty
liability even though a different result might accrue under the law of
agency."'
D. Second-Hand Goods
Originally, Florida's Supreme Court acknowledged the then general
rule that there was no implied warranty as to the condition, adaptation,
fitness, or suitability of a second-hand article." 2 The only recourse open
to the injured buyer of a defective used product was a cause of action in
negligence for the seller's failure to properly inspect and warn of any in-
herent dangers due to a latent defect." 8 Case law, however, beginning
with Enix v. Diamond T Sales & Service Co.," 4 gradually became sym-
pathetic to the consumer of the second-hand good. The second district
found the earlier allusion to implied warranties of second-hand goods by
the supreme court to be "mere obiter dicta," since the particular case in-
volved only express warranties on second-hand articles; consequently,
there may be an implied warranty on the sale of a second-hand prod-
uct." 5 In a subsequent case,"' the second district qualified its previous
opinion in Enix.
With respect to second-hand articles of personal property, gen-
erally the rule is that there is no implied warranty as to the con-
dition, fitness or quality of the article .... To support liability
upon the contractual warranty the purchaser must have relied
thereon, and in addition thereto his reliance must have been
justified under the circumstances.
Thus, the plaintiff had no cause of action in implied warranty against the
seller of a used boat in need of repairs because he was not justified in re-
lying on the seller's statement that the nine-year-old yacht was in perfect
shape. Faced with the adoption of inconsistent positions concerning im-
plied warranties of second-hand goods, the second district court of appeal
attempted to rectify the dilemma in a subsequent decision.'" The plain-
tiff, an employee of a service station, was injured by a defective wheel
rim while repairing a tire on a used truck recently purchased from the
110. Hardee v. Gordon Thompson Chevrolet, Inc., 154 So.2d 174 (Fla. Ist Dist. 1963).
111. See Ford Motor Co. v. Pittman, 227 So.2d 246 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1969).
112. McDonald v. Sanders, 103 Fla. 93, 137 So. 122 (1931).
113. Walker v. National Gun Traders, Inc., 116 So.2d 792 (Fla. 1960).
114. 188 So.2d 48 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1966).
115. Id. at 51. By distinguishing McDonald v. Sanders, 103 Fla. 93, 137 So. 122 (1931),
the second district reached its desired result.
116. Keating v. DeArment, 193 So.2d 694 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1967).
117. Id. at 696. Reliance is not a necessary element to establish express warranty
liability under the UCC, so the case might have gone the other way if decided under Florida
Statutes § 672.313 (1969).
118. Brown v. Hall, 221 So.2d 454 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969).
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defendant-seller. The suit against the seller was based on negligence and
breach of implied warranty. In determining whether a warranty action
was proper, the court stated that although the action was brought prior
to the effective date of the UCC,"'
[w]hen the seller knew the purpose for which the buyer pur-
chased the truck and knew the buyer was relying on his skill
and judgment in the selection of a second-hand truck, an im-
plied warranty arose as a matter of law that the truck so sold
was in fact fit and in condition for the purpose intended."'
The implied warranty remedy was unavailable to the particular plaintiff
due to the lack of privity of contract with the seller. The implied war-
ranty "extended no further than the purchaser," thus excluding the "em-
ployee of a third person independently contracting with a purchaser to
perform repair service on the article in question." 21
E. Contributory Negligence
Although warranties are governed by contract law, 122 the issue of
whether contributory negligence is a defense to breach of warranty has
not been resolved in Florida, as evidenced by a recent third district
opinion.'
V. PROCEDURE
A. Statute of Limitations
In any statute of limitations inquiry, two questions must be asked:
what is the applicable statute; and when does it commence to run? The
supreme court recently answered both queries. 4 In an implied warranty
action for personal injuries caused by a defective refrigerator door, the
plaintiff brought suit one year after the accident and five years after the
original purchase. The applicable statute, according to the court, was
Florida Statutes section 95.11 (5) (e) Y'12 The three year period under the
statute began to run "from the time the plaintiff first discovered, or rea-
119. See FLA. STAT. § 672.315 (1969).
120. Brown v. Hall, 221 So.2d 454, 458 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969). Essentially, the court
followed their previous opinion in Enix and overruled any of their language in Keating
that deviated from the rule established in Enix.
121. Id.
122. "Warranties, as relates to sales, are strictly contractual in nature. This is so,
whether the warranty is express or implied." Brown v. Hall, 221 So.2d 454, 458 (Fla. 2d
Dist. 1969).
123. Sears, Roebuck & Co., Inc. v. Davis, 234 So.2d 695 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970).
124. Creviston v. General Motors Corp., 225 So.2d 331 (Fla. 1969).
125. The implied warranty action was classified as "an action upon a contract, obligation
or liability not founded upon an instrument in writing." FLA. STAT. § 95.11(5)(e) (1969).
The Fifth Circuit found this same statute to be applicable to implied warranty actions in
Roger Lee, Inc. v. Trend Mills, Inc., 410 F.2d 928 (5th Cir. 1969). See also Hendon v.
Stanley Home Products, Inc., 225 So.2d 553 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969).
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sonably should have discovered the defect constituting the breach of
warranty."' 2 Therefore, the plaintiff's suit in warranty was timely.
Displaying a realistic attitude toward the nature of the warranty ac-
tion lodged against the manufacturer by an injured consumer, the second
district court of appeal refuted the alleged applicability of the three year
statute of limitations under Florida Statutes section 95.11(5) (e) to such
an action, since that particular section dealt with purely contractual rem-
edies. 27
When a manufacturer cannot absolve himself of liability in im-
plied warranty through contract; when no privity is required
for the ultimate consumer or user of the manufacturer's product
to bring suit against him; and when the provision of the Uni-
form Commercial Code pertaining to exclusion or modification
of warranties is held to be inapplicable to such suits, it would
take a large measure of imagination to find such an action to be
contractual in nature. 28
Unable to label the cause of action based on implied warranty by a con-
sumer against a manufacturer as ex contractu or ex delicto, the court ap-
plied the four year statute of limitations stipulated in Florida Statutes
section 95.11(4), which governs "any action for relief not specifically
provided for in this chapter." The extra year of eligibility saved the
plaintiff's suit. This four year statute of limitations has been extended to
implied warranty actions brought against the seller under the UCC,129
except where the contract of sale specifies a shorter period. However, a
disadvantage of the UCC is that the four year limit commences from the
date when tender of delivery is made, not from the date of the discovery
of the defect.
B. Wrongful Death Actions
In Whiteley v. Webb's City,8 ' the Supreme Court of Florida took
the position that the Wrongful Death Statute (Florida Statutes section
768) was only designed to apply to actions arising out of torts. Thus, the
implied warranty which arose out of contract was not an appropriate ba-
sis for an action under the statute. The Florida Legislature responded in
1953 by amending Florida Statutes section 768.01 to "include actions ex
contractu." The effect of the amendment was "presumably to encompass
a death action based on a cause of action for breach of implied war-
ranty .... ,1 8
126. Creviston v. General Motors Corp., 225 So.2d 331, 333 (Fla. 1969).
127. Barfield v. United States Rubber Co., 234 So.2d 374 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1970).
128. Id. at 377.
129. FLA. STAT. § 672.725(1) (1969).
130. 55 So.2d 730 (Fla. 1951).
131. Moragne v. State Marine Lines, Inc., 211 So.2d 161 (Fla. 1968), rev'd on other
grounds, 398 U.S. 375 (1970). See also Public Admin. of New York County v. Curtiss-
Wright Corp., 224 F. Supp. 236 (S.D.N.Y. 1963), wherein the court applied Florida law.
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VI. MOVEMENT TOWARD STRICT LIABILITY IN TORT
A. Background
The strict liability in tort doctrine is divided into two schools of
thought-the Greenman182 approach and the Restatement 8  rule. The
former concept was formulated by Justice Traynor in an attempt to dis-
sipate the confusion that surrounded the warranty action-was it tort or
contract? Choosing to label the action as tort, the following rule was
adopted:
[a] manufacturer is strictly liable in tort when an article he
places on the market, knowing it is to be used without inspec-
tion for defects, proves to have a defect that causes injury to a
human being.8
The strict tort liability under Greenman was extended in California be-
yond manufacturers to retailers, s5 lessors, 80 and bailors8 7 of defective
products, and the scope of protection was broadened to include injured
bystanders,' as well as users or consumers. Although difficult to accu-
rately pinpoint the states that have adopted the Greenman rule, it is pos-
sible to designate those jurisdictions that have either adopted it verbatim
or accepted a modified version with a similar result.'
The Restatement rule on strict liability states that:
One who sells14° any product in a defective condition unreason-
ably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is
subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ulti-
mate user or consumer, or to his property, if (a) the seller is en-
gaged in the business of selling such a product, and (b) it is
132. Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr.
697 (1963) (hereinafter cited as Greenman).
133. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) (hereinafter cited as RESTATE-
MENT).
134. Greenman, 59 Cal. 2d 57, 62, 377 P.2d 897, 900, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 700 (1963).
135. See Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 391 P.2d 168, 37 Cal. Rptr.
896 (1964).
136. See McClaflin v. Bayshore Equipment Rental Co., 274 A.C.A. 487, 79 Cal. Rptr.
337 (1969) ; see also Garcia v. Halsett, 3 Cal. App. 3d 319, 82 Cal. Rptr. 420 (1970).
137. Price v. Shell Oil Co., 2 Cal. 3d 245, 466 P.2d 722, 85 Cal. Rptr. 178 (1970).
138. Elmore v. American Motors Corp., 70 Cal. 2d 578, 451 P.2d 84, 75 Cal. Rptr. 652
(1969). The bystander could recover damages from both the retailer and the manufacturer
of the defective automobile in Elmore. See also Priessman v. Ford Motor Co., 1 Cal. App.
3d 845, 82 Cal. Rptr. 108 (1969).
139. Ginnis v. Mapes Hotel Corp., 470 P.2d 135 (Nev. 1970) (manufacturer); Suvada
v. White, 32 Ill. 2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182 (1965) (manufacturer) ; Santor v. A & M
Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965) (manufacturer) [Newark v. Gimbel's,
Inc., 54 N.J. 585, 258 A.2d 769 (1969) (retailer); Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing, Inc., 45
N.J. 434, 212 A.2d 769 (1965) (bailor)]; Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., 12
N.Y.2d 432, 240 N.Y.S.2d 594, 191 N.E.2d 81 (1963) (manufacturer and retailer).
140. RESTATEMENT § 402A, comment f defines the seller to be either a manufacturer,
wholesale or retail dealer, distributor, or operator of a restaurant.
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expected to and does reach the user or consumer without sub-
stantial change in the condition in which it is sold.14
Liability is based purely on tort;' 42 however, whether the rule should be
applied to nonusers and nonconsumers has not been determined. 43 The
Restatement principle has found acceptance in a significant number of
states: Arizona; 4 4  Connecticut; 145  Hawaii; 148  Indiana; 4 7  Minne-
sota; 'l Mississippi; 149 Missouri; 150 New Hampshire; 151 Pennsylva-
nia; 152 Texas;153 and Wisconsin. 5 4
Although the two approaches are distinguishable on minor points,155
they yield basically the same end product, using similar means. Under
both concepts, the supplier of the defective article that produces personal
injury (or property damage under the Restatement) is rendered strictly
liable in tort. The plaintiff, in order to recover, must prove that 1) he was
injured by the defendant's product, 2) the injury occurred because the
product was defective and unreasonably dangerous for use, 3) the prod-
uct was defective when it left the hands of the defendant, and 4) it was
reasonably foreseeable by the defendant that the plaintiff would use the
product in the particular manner intended and suffer injury from such
use if the product were defective. However, it should be noted that the
Restatement rule may be more restrictive than implied warranty in the
following aspects: 1) the Restatement requires that the product be both
defective and unreasonably dangerous, while implied warranty demands
only a defective good where the action is brought by one in privity of con-
tract with the defendant; 2) the Restatement leaves open the question of
liability to bystanders, while the Toombs case on its particular facts ex-
tended warranty liability to an injured bystander, and even negligence
141. RESTATEMENT § 402A(1).
142. Id. at comment m.
143. Id. at comment o.
144. Wagner v. Coronet Hotel, 10 Ariz. App. 296, 458 P.2d 390 (1969) (manufacturer).
145. Garthwait v. Burgio, 153 Conn. 284, 216 A.2d 189 (1965) (manufacturer).
146. Stewart v. Budget Rent-a-Car Corp., 52 Hawaii Adv. 4858, 470 P.2d 240 (1970)
(sellers and lessors).
147. Cornette v. Searjeant Metal Products, Inc., 258 N.E.2d 652 (Ind. Ct. App. 1970).
148. McCormack v. Hankscraft Co., 278 Minn. 322, 154 N.W.2d 488 (1967) (manu-
facturer).
149. State Stove Manufacturing Co. v. Hodges, 189 So.2d 113 (Miss. 1966) (manu-
facturer).
150. Keener v. Dayton Electric Manufacturing Co., 445 S.W.2d 362 (Mo. 1969).
151. Buttrick v. Arthur Lessard & Sons, Inc., 260 A.2d 111 (N.H. 1968) (retailer).
152. Webb v. Zern, 422 Pa. 424, 220 A.2d 853 (1966) (manufacturer or distributor).
153. McKisson v. Sales Affiliates, Inc., 416 S.W.2d 787 (Tex. 1967) (manufacturer or
distributor).
154. Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967) (manufacturer and seller).
155. E.g., bystanders are protected under Greenman, as it has been later interpreted
(see note 138 supra), but not under the RESTATEMENT (see note 143 supra). However, certain
states that have embraced RESTATEMENT 402A have allowed bystanders to recover. See
Darryl v. Ford Motor Co., 440 S.W.2d 630 (Tex. 1969); Mitchell v. Miller, 26 Conn. Sup.
142, 214 A.2d 694 (1965).
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law has brought the bystander within the scope of recovery; and 3) the
defenses to liability under the Restatement include assumption of the risk
(comment n) and use of the product by the plaintiff in a way not in-
tended by the manufacturer.
B. The Answer to the Privity Dilemma
The warranty law in Florida is fraught with legal inconsistencies
and misapplications as a result of the judiciary's attempt to provide jus-
tice to the injured consumer, user, employee, bystander, etc., while still
maintaining the age-old contract principle of privity. The incongruities
which have permeated the warranty area become self-evident upon an
analysis of the judicial decisions which have contributed to the privity
dilemma.
In implied warranty actions brought against the manufacturer of a
defective and injurious product, the immediate purchaser as well as the
remote ultimate purchaser, have been ruled outside the scope of the man-
ufacturer's privity circle; however, the courts merely avoided the obsta-
cle of privity by rendering it unnecessary for recovery in these particular
fact patterns.15 In effect, a third exception to privity was added to the
two general exceptions-foodstuffs and dangerous instrumentalities.15 A
fourth exception to privity arose where the injured plaintiff was a con-
sumer or user of the manufacturer's defective goods: even though the
product was neither a foodstuff nor a dangerous instrumentality and the
plaintiff was not a party to a contract with the manufacturer, recovery
was permitted by matter-of-factly dispensing with the requirement of
privity. I58 Although employees of the purchaser of an injurious product
are even further removed from privity with the manufacturer than are
customers or users, they may utilize the implied warranty action to seek
damages; the rationale being found in the general assertion that privity
is no longer an essential requisite in imposing warranty liability on the
manufacturer. 5 ' Thus, a fifth exception to privity obtains where the em-
ployee and the manufacturer are opposing parties.
Nevertheless, these ex post facto inroads on the privity defense of
the manufacturer are absent when the defendant is the retailer of the de-
fective goods. Evidently, the courts found a justification for differentiat-
ing between the two. Only the purchaser or his family or the user can
maintain an implied warranty action against the retailer, except where
the defective goods are foodstuffs or dangerous instrumentalities. 60 The
156. Continental Copper & Steel Industries, Inc. v. E.C. "Red" Cornelius, Inc., 104 So.2d
40 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1958) (immediate purchaser); Power Ski of Florida, Inc. v. Allied Chemi-
cal Corp., 188 So.2d 13 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966) (remote ultimate purchaser).
157. Carter v. Hector Supply Co., 128 So.2d 390 (Fla. 1961).
158. Lily-Tulip Cup Corp. v. Bernstein, 181 So.2d 641 (Fla. 1966); Engel v. Lawyers
Co-operative Publishing Co., 198 So.2d 93 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967).
159. Vandercock & Son, Inc. v. Thorpe, 395 F.2d 104 (9th Cir. 1968); Barfield v.
Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co., 197 So.2d 545 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1967).
160. McBurnette v. Playground Equipment Corp., 137 So.2d 563 (Fla. 1962); Carter
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extension of seller liability to the family of the buyer was achieved by the
expedient of viewing the family member as standing in the shoes of the
purchaser, thus bringing him within the purchaser's contractual relation-
ship with the seller.'' However, the same logic did not obtain in the case
of an employee of the purchaser, 162 despite the reasonable conclusion that
such employee could certainly be expected to be the intended beneficiary
of the warranty provided his employer. Consistent with the negating of
the seller's responsibility to the employee of the buyer, the injured em-
ployee of an independent contractor doing business with the purchaser of
a faulty second-hand good was denied a cause of action for breach of im-
plied warranty against the dealer of the second-hand product. 63 The in-
nocent bystander who is injured by a defective product and who is admit-
tedly devoid of any contractual relationship with either the retailer or
manufacturer is without recourse to the warranty remedy unless the
product be a foodstuff or dangerous instrumentality.6 4
The dangerous instrumentality exception to the privity requirement,
unfortunately, is neither clearly defined nor readily comprehensible. The
fact that a product, which is neither fit for use nor merchantable, causes
injury to a person should automatically invoke the characterization of
being dangerous. However, the judiciary has envisioned a difference be-
tween commodities that inflict harm, labeling some as dangerous while
others as inherently nondangerous. Consequently, in practical applica-
tion, butane gas is a dangerous instrumentality and the injured bystander
can recover against the owner or manufacturer; 165 conversely, a rubber
disk attachment to a sanding kit, which, upon disintegration, causes seri-
ous injury to the bystander's eye, is not a dangerous commodity and the
retailer is protected from liability by the shield of privity166 Similarly,
although chlorine gas is termed a dangerous commodity, defective gas
masks which permit the deleterious gas to be inhaled by the user-
bystander are not dangerous instrumentalities so as to render the owner
or distributor of the masks liable for breach of implied warranty.'6 7 The
dangerous instrumentality qualification of the privity requirement in
warranty is as impractical as the very concept of privity of contract in
those factual situations where the personal injury plaintiff is outside the
circle of privity and recovery must be based on a judicially-created excep-
tion to guarantee justice. Does the end justify the means?
v. Hector Supply Co., 128 So.2d 390 (Fla. 1961); Rodriguez v. Shell's City, Inc., 141 So.2d
590 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962).
161. McBurnette v. Playground Equipment Corp., 137 So.2d 563 (Fla. 1962).
162. Odum v. Gulf Tire & Supply Co., 196 F. Supp. 35 (N.D. Fla. 1961); Carter v.
Hector Supply Co., 128 So.2d 390 (Fla. 1961). But see FLA. STAT. § 672.318 (1969).
163. Brown v. Hall, 221 So.2d 454 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969).
164. Toombs v. Fort Pierce Gas Co., 208 So.2d 615 (Fla. 1968); cf. Rodriguez v.
Shell's City, Inc., 141 So.2d 590 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962).
165. Toombs v. Fort Pierce Gas Co., 208 So.2d 615 (Fla. 1968).
166. Rodriguez v. Shell's City, Inc., 141 So.2d 590 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962).
167. Adair v. The Island Club, 225 So.2d 541 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969).
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Instead of expanding privity of contract beyond its natural bounda-
ries or abandoning privity under a proliferation of tenuous exceptions, it
is urged that the Florida judiciary discard the overburdened and ill-
adapted warranty action based on contract as the sole remedy for the
noncontractual plaintiff injured by a defective product.
No one doubts that, in the absence of privity, the liability must
be in tort and not in contract. There is no need to borrow a con-
cept from the contract law of sales; and it is only by some vio-
lent pounding and twisting that 'warranty' can be made to serve
the purpose at all. It would be far simpler if it were simply said
that there is strict liability in tort, declared outright, without an
illusory contract mask. 68
Strict liability in tort is the alternative open to the courts to disperse
the contusion surrounding the implied warranty action and, in particular,
the necessity of privity of contract. This is not an endorsement for the
blanket substitution of strict liability in tort in place of implied warranty
nor is the demise of implied warranty called for. However, it is suggested
that in those circumstances where the plaintiff is injured by a defective
product, but is devoid of any contractual relationship with the defendant
(manufacturer, retailer, owner, distributor, lessor, bailor, etc.), then the
proper vehicle for recovery is strict liability in tort, which rejects privity
of contract in favor of the test that the plaintiff be a reasonably foresee-
able victim of the defective product. Though the third district court of
appeal in Royal v. Black and Decker Mfg. Co.' 69 tacitly approved the
strict liability theory expressed in both Greenman and the Restatement,
it did not unconditionally adopt such theory since, in the absence of a
defect in the injurious product, there could be no liability of the manu-
facturer under any remedy, whether it be negligence, warranty, or strict
liability. Toombs v. Fort Pierce Gas Co.'7 0 applied the strict tort
liability concept, but labeled it under the misnomer of the "dangerous in-
strumentality exception in implied warranty." The stage has been set for
the curtain to rise on strict liability in tort and to forever relegate implied
warranty to its proper contractual setting.
168. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 97, at 681 (3d ed. 1964).
169. 205 So.2d 307 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967).
170. 208 So.2d 615 (Fla. 1968).
